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et al.: Legislative State Action and Indiana Private Universities

LEGISLATIVE STATE ACTION AND
INDIANA PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES
INTRODUCTION

An absence of state action renders courts incapable of applying
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to
private individuals or private institutions. A demonstrable proclivity upon the part of courts to include seemingly private actions
within the protective realm of the fourteenth amendment has,
however, been evidenced by court decisions during the last quarter
of a century.' Early Supreme Court pronouncements of the state
action requirement have not been diluted;2 the Harlan analysis,
1. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308 (1968) (privately-owned shopping center held to be within
ambit of the fourteenth amendment since it constituted private property
serving a public function); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966) (state
laws which permit private violations of constitutional rights are state action) ;
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)
(private park sufficiently public
in function to carry the application of fourteenth amendment guarantees);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 714 (1961) (lease for
garage which contains covenant to uphold state law was state action); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)
(Chicago police liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (judicial enforcement of
a suit based upon restrictive private covenant was invalid) ; Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(private pre-primary was state action); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 834 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of private covenant was
state action); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town action
was state action because town fulfilled a public function); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (the actions of Georgia peace officers
held to be state action); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(party
primaries regulated by law were state action); Brown v. Pennsylvania, 392
F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968) (court substitution
of private trustees for city officials to administer trust establishing racially
restrictive trust constituted state action) ; Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d
902 (4th Cir. 1943) (inaction by a state official held to constitute state action).
2. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The majority of the Supreme Court based their position upon the contention that private individuals
are inherently incapable of denying the constitutional rights of other private
citizens. Private wrongs were viewed as mere assaults. It was argued that
such assaults might deter exercise of a right but that they could not deny
the right itself. Some recent leading cases [by lower courts] involving
private universities [following the Civil Rights Cases] include Blouin v.
Loyola University, 506 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1975) (teacher refused contract renewal allegedly due to first amendment activity; court found no state action) ;
Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974) (no state action
found, where balancing test was employed); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School,
478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (expulsion in retaliation for first amend-
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which rejected the state action theory, has never been revived.'
Yet, while the Court will not acknowledge purely private action as
a mandate for the fourteenth amendment's constitutional safeguards, the spirit of Justice Harlan's position nevertheless permeates contemporary interpretations of the state action doctrine."
ment activity did not constitute state action); Blackburn v. Fisk University,
443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (where 12 students suspended without hearing,
court found no state action, since higher education was not a public function) ; Coleman v. Wagner, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (possible state
action due to state legislation); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
1969) (39 students suspended and no state action found); Powe v. Miles,
407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) (no state action in private university cooperating
with state except in State Ceramics School); Hammond v. University of
Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965) (use of public land constituted state
action); Guillory v. Administration of Tulane University, 203 F. Supp. 855
(E.D. La. 1962), rev'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962) (higher education was
public function constituting state action).
3. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan rejected the distinction, drawn by the majority (see note 2,
supra), relating to the different technical effects of state action, as opposed
to private action. He did not view the specific words of the fourteenth amendment as controlling. Having identified the amendment's purpose, to eradicate
the wrongs committed against blacks, he saw no reason to exclude private
actions from its reach. However, his view has been repeatedly repudiated.
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875).
4. The fear of expansion of federal power was a fundamental reason
for the majority ruling in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.3 (1883) (see note 2
supra). This fear is no longer a primary influence in state action inquiries.
Contemporary theorists base their hesitancy to expand the state action doctrine upon a balancing of state interest and the significance of the constitutional right in jeopardy. Leading scholarly opinion on "state action" can be
found in Black, Forward: State Action, Equal Protection and California's
Proposition14, 81 HARV. L. Rzv. 69 (1967) (courts ought to find state action
as a matter of course and limit its effects through other doctrines or interests); Henldn, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA.
L. Rsv. 473 (1962) (a balancing test must be utilized, weighing the discriminating party's property rights, right of association, right to privacy, and
right to liberty of action, against the interests of the victim in not having
the state support discrimination against him); Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for State Action Under the FourteenthAmendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv.
208 (1957); Karst and Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. CT. REv. 39; Silard, A Constitutional
Forecast: Demise of the State Action Limit on the Equal Protection Clause,
66 COLUM. L. REv. 855 (1966) (the state's ostensible obligation to apply
fourteenth amendment guarantees to private action may be dissolved by
other constitutional provisions, e.g., the free exercise clause); Williams, The
Twilight of State Action, 41 Tax. L. REv. 347 (1963) (courts must weigh
private interest in particular discrimination against public interest in the
elimination of the discriminatory activity).
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The egalitarian notion that all invasions of constitutionally pro5
tected liberties should be eradicated has received court approval.
Recent constructions of state action requirements approach Justice
Harlan's goal of reaching all private invasions of constitutionally
protected liberties.'
Certain private wrongs, however, remain outside the reach of
the fourteenth amendment. If the state involvement does not directly attach to the acts which violate protected rights, courts are
left with no basis upon which to declare those acts unconstitutional ;"
5. See note 1 supra.
6. Id. But see notes 7-8 infra and accompanying text.
7. Recent adjudication on the part of the Burger Court has caused
some commentators to conclude that state action theory has been altered
in such a way as to narrow the scope of its application. (See Note, State
Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REy. 840, 872 (1974), concluding
that the Nixon Court "has called a halt" to the "almost limitless expansion"
of "state action.") The major decisions which have caused this concern are
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Gilmore v. City
of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
It is crucial to understand that while the Burger Court may have evidenced
a hesitancy to utilize the fourteenth amendment in peculiar fact situations,
the conceptual analysis of the state action inquiry proposed by the Warren
Court still receives adherence. In each of these cases, the majority has employed the previously articulated standard that the state involvement must
go directly to the allegedly unconstitutional private activity and not simply
attach to the private activity involved.
This approach is not a retreat from such decisions as Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 714 (1961), or such authoritative lower
court opinions as Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). In Jackson,
supra at 351, the majority held, "the inquiry must be whether there is sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be treated as that of the
state itself." In Gilmore, supra at 573, the majority did not decide the state
action question; but in remanding it, the Court applied the Burton test and
suggested that state action was probably present. In Moose Lodge, supra at
173, the majority simply held that mere licensing of the private entity did
not constitute the requisite nexus to the objectionable private activity.
If in fact the Burger Court has diluted the Warren analysis, it has
forced plaintiffs to prove that there is a significant link between the state
activity and the private action which is alleged to be unconstitutional. The
facts of Jackson, Gilmore, and Moose Lodge only established that state action
was linked to the existence of the private entities; they did not establish that
the state activities reached the constitutional deprivations. However, the
Indiana State Legislature has linked itself directly to unconstitutional actions
of Indiana private university officials. Confronting the issue of university
discipline policies, the legislature has encouraged private university officials
to use a free hand (see IND. CODE § 35-19-4-1 (1969)).
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the private acts are not encompassed by the necessary state-private
relationship. Any study of the historical development of the state
action doctrine reveals the continued expansion of the fourteenth
amendment's ambit.8 Current standards demand only that constitutional violations be attributed to a state-private partnership; the
state contribution to the partnership need not constitute as much
as the private contribution. When private actions are permitted
by state statute, the requisite partnership should be established.
Specific Indiana legislation regarding Indiana's private universities" should be construed as sufficient state action to implant all
disciplinary acts by private university officials in Indiana within
the scope of fourteenth amendment protection. Verification of this
position is provided by an analysis of state action norms, as well
as case law which is analogous to the Indiana situation.
STANDARDS FOR PROOF OF STATE ACTION

It is impossible to formulate an acceptable definition of state
action.'" The Supreme Court has emphasized that ultimate determinations of whether or not a peculiar set of circumstances meet
the state action test require a case-by-case inquiry. "Only by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement
of the state in private conduct be attributed its true significance.""
While one inclusive standard does not exist, it is not difficult
to establish several guidelines which are relevant to ultimate
determinations of state action in all circumstances. Actions of any
state agent or agency will constitute state action.' It is not necessary that the state action precede the acts of the private individuals
Importantly, the Burger Court repeatedly limits its holding to the fact
situation at hand. It is at best a misdescription to characterize the peculiar
applications of an established constitutional doctrine to specific fact situations by a temporary and slender majority as new limitations on that doctrine.
8. See notes 1 and 7 supra.
9. IND. CoDE § 35-19-4-6 (1969). See note 24 infra.
10. It is imperative that the scope of the state action doctrine be
understood as continually evolving. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1966), the very capability of a state to remain neutral in the face of private
constitutional violations is brought into question. See generally C. Black,
State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L.
Rav. 69 (1967).
11. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966)
(legislative
branch); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial action); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (all branches).
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or private institutions.'3 The state action does not have to be the
direct cause of those private actions which infringe upon individual
rights.' 4 The particular state involvement must, however, relate
directly to the specific constitutional violations."
Each of the three divisions of government is sufficiently
representative of the state to constitute the requisite participant
in a violation of the fourteenth amendment.' 6 Supreme Court inquiries during the past century have led inexorably to this conclusion."' All distinctions between the executive, legislative and
judiciary lack importance within the state action inquiry; each
branch is equally accountable through the constitution of the state
itself.
Actions which are initiated by private individuals can clearly
be transformed into state action by subsequent intervention by a
state agent or agency. "Nor is the amendment ineffective simply
because the particular pattern of discrimination, which the state
has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a private agreement."' 8 When the private acts precede state involvement, any evidence of reassurance given to the private party, due to the state's
participation, is significant. Such reassurance demonstrates that
the state activity relates directly to the deprivation of constitutional
guarantees.
Since the sequence in which the joint actions occur should
not be conclusive of the state action inquiry, it becomes apparent
that there is no need to establish causation between the action of
the state and the ultimate deprivation of constitutional rights.
Private action which is the overwhelming and direct cause of the
13. Although action initiated by private individuals can clearly be
transformed into state action by subsequent intervention by a state agent
or agency, proof of a private response to an act by the state constitutes a
stronger argument for implementation of the state action doctrine. See
generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1971); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120
(2d Cir. 1970).
14. Since the private and state acts need not comply to any requisite
order, causation does not seem to be required.
15. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
16. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
17. There is no rationale which would favor one branch of government
over another. Nevertheless, Supreme Court determination that each branch's
actions constituted state action required waiting for facts constituting state
involvement by each of the separate branches. See notes 1 and 12 supra.
18. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
19. See Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
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unconstitutional deprivations of freedom may, nevertheless, constitute state action if the state has merely "elected to place its power,
property, and prestige behind" the violative acts." The Supreme
Court will invoke the state action doctrine upon proof of the existence of a form of partnership between the state and the private
actor.'
It is very possible that a state may be involved in a type of
partnership with an individual which is not connected to the individual's conduct. The partnership itself must bear directly upon
the private conduct which is violative of the constitutional rights
of others. Mere authorization of a private entity which commits
unconstitutional acts is insufficient in itself. The participation
by the state, in the partnership, must authorize or encourage the
private wrongs which violate the constitution.
Any analysis of potential state action problems will be facilitated by recognition of these standards. Constant reference to
these guidelines will ensure clarity in approach to the Indiana problem discussed below.2 It is imperative, however, that one retain
the understanding that all state action standards exist as elements
of a continually evolving doctrine. There is no complete set of
state action requirements; rather, the trend is toward expansion
of the doctrine.2
INDIANA STATUTE

Discipline on college campuses became a significant problem
during the 1960's. Indiana traditionally did not restrict the disciplinarian role of private university officials. Problems of vandalism and disrespect for educational facilities prompted the
20.

The majority opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 360

(1966)

stated:
Although the state neither commanded nor expressly authorized or
encouraged the discrimination, the state had elected to place its power,
property, and prestige behind the admitted discrimination and . . .
has made itself a partner to the refusal of service ...
Id. at 380.
21. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 407 U.S. 163 (1971).
22. See note 61 infra.
23. A glance at the state action doctrine's history reveals the continual
expansion of the vicissitudes of the fourteenth amendment. In the absence
of a clear definition of state action and a Supreme Court pronouncement on
its applicability to this note's subject matter, a constant recognition of this
doctrine's

growth strengthens one's perception

of the

possibilities of the

doctrine's applicability to the private university setting. See notes 1 and 7
eupra.
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Indiana legislature to join in a mutual effort with public university
officials to rid the campuses of menacing students.2 ' Not only did
the legislature elect to define particular offenses of trespass and
their corresponding penalties (for public university students), it
chose to authorize complete discretion by private university officials in all private university disciplinary actions. This final provision places the state of Indiana and private universities in a
partnership which encompasses all disciplinary action within the.
private institutions. The law provides:
Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as affecting the
right of any person to engage in conduct not in violation
of this act or any rule or regulation of any such institution,
or of any institution established for the purpose of education of students to discharge any employee, or expel, suspend or otherwise punish any student, in accordance with
its procedures for any conduct which may be a violation
24. See note 55 infra. The statutes state:
IND. CODE § 35-19-4-1 (1969). It shall be a misdemeanor for any person intentionally to damage any property, real or personal, of
any institution established for the purpose of the education of students
enrolled therein.
IND. CODE § 35-19-4-2 (1969). It shall be a misdemeanor for any person to go upon or remain upon any part of the real property of any
institution established for the purpose of the education of students
enrolled therein in violation of any rule or regulation of such institution for the purpose of interfering with the lawful use of such
property by others or in such manner as to have the effect of denying
or interfering with the lawful use of such property by others.
It shall be a misdemeanor for any
IND. CODE § 35-19-4-4 (1969).
person to go upon or remain within a public building for the purpose
of interfering with the lawful use of such building by other persons
or in such manner as to have the effect of denying to others the
lawful use of such building.
IND. CODE § 35-19-4-5 (1969). A person who commits a misdemeanor
defined in this act shall be punished, upon conviction, by a fine not to
exceed five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not to exceed
six months, or by both fine and imprisonment.
The above provisions apply only to public institutions by title. The final
provision, by its language, includes all institutions:
IND. CODE § 35-19-4-6 (1969). Nothing in this act shall be interpreted
as affecting the right of any person to engage in conduct not in
violation of this act or any rule or regulation of any such institution,
or of any institution, established for the purpose of education of students to discharge any employee, or expel, suspend or otherwise punish
any student, in accordance with its procedures for any conduct which
may be a violation of any such rule or regulation of any such institution or rendered unlawful by this act or may otherwise be deemed
a crime or misdemeanor (emphasis added).
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of any such rule or regulation of any such institution or
rendered unlawful by this act or may otherwise be deemed
a crime or misdemeanor.2 5
The statute grants state authority to private university officials
to take all actions which they deem appropriate; conformity to the
United States Constitution is not required.'
Robert O'Neil, professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley, has previously observed with regard to this
statute that:
The situation in Indiana is far less clear. .

.

. The last

clause may give the case away. There is ample precedent
for the view that Indiana has now made Notre Dame's enforcement of student conduct rules reviewable in the federal courts for this reason if no other. When a state has
merely "encouraged" or "authorized" private action that
may infringe individual liberties, the Fourteenth Amendment arguably applies. This much Indiana quite clearly
if unwittingly seems to have done here.2 '
Mr. O'Neil concluded that it is arguable that IND. CODE § 35-19-4-6
establishes state action in the disciplinary measures taken by
private university officials. A more extensive analysis of the
statute and case law establishes that the enactment in fact meets
the requirements of state action. The state has granted a statutory
right to priva.te university officials to use uninhibited discretion in
the disciplining of students. The statute formulates the kind of
partnership which is sought by the courts in state action inquiries.2
25. IND. CODE § S5-19-4-6 (1969).
26. It is arguable that the statute's final clause is a mere formalization of the legislature's intent not to alter the status quo re private institutions. However, the specificity of the clause and the intent of the legislature
to usurp the private sector's authority to pronounce itself outside of the
statute's scope is significant. The legislators intended to ensure that private
university officials were encouraged to discipline students without the threat
of constitutional procedures. It is not the intent of the legislature with regard
to the viability of the fourteenth amendment in the private sphere which
is salient. Rather, the intent of the legislature to actively authorize or encourage private acts which are in violation of the constitution is crucial
to the state action inquiry.
27. R. O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BuFF. L. REv.
155, 185 (1969).
28. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1971). The statute
can be read to find that the state and private university are "joint venturers"
in the discretionary control of student activism. Id. at 177. The majority
found "state action" with respect to the liquor control board regulation which
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An analogous state action problem has been reviewed by the
Supreme Court.2 9 Unbridled discretion placed by a state legislature
in the hands of private individuals was determined to be state
action. The rigors of the fourteenth amendment were available to
redress the unconstitutional acts of private parties which exercised
such state-authorized discretion.
THE RACE CASE ANALOGY

California enacted a constitutional amendment which granted
all landowners the right to use uninhibited discretion in renting
and/or selling their land. ° A black man was denied an opportunity to purchase a specific piece of land solely because he was
black. The prospective buyer brought suit, invoking the equal
proection clause of the fourteenth amendment, in an attempt to
force the seller to complete the sales transaction. This case, Reitman v. Mulkey,' reached the Supreme Court in 1966. Justice White,
writing the majority opinion, held that the legislative efforts were
sufficient state action for utilization of fourteenth amendment
equal protection standards. The Court held that the amendment
announced the constitutional right of any person to decline
to sell or lease his real property to anyone to whom he
did not desire to sell or lease. . . . Private discrimination in housing . . . now enjoyed a far different status.
• . . The right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now
embodied in the state's basic charter. . . . Those practicing racial discrimination need no longer rely solely on
their personal choice. They could now invoke express constitutional authority....
required that every club adhere to its constitution and by-laws, since that
regulation put the authoritative power of the state behind the continued
practice of discrimination embodied in the Moose Lodge documents. The
Court's choice of remedy was injunctive relief. Such a remedy would not
be appropriate to the sort of private wrong considered here.
29. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966), the Supreme Court
reviewed a constitutional amendment enacted by the state of California.
The amendment, like the Indiana statute, permitted private discretion--even
when it violated the constitutional rights of other private individuals.
30. CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 26. The section reads:
Neither the State nor any subdivision thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly the right of any person, who is willing
or desires to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons
as he in his absolute discretion chooses.
31. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966).

82. Id. at 377.
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The majority opinion observed that while the constitutional amendment did not command or even expressly authorize discrimination
on racial grounds, the state had nevertheless so commingled its
action with the private discriminatory act that the application of
the fourteenth amendment was mandated 3. 3 The commingling of
the state authorization with the private act of discrimination created state action. Reitman stands for the proposition that state
legislative authorization of private discretion renders the private
exercise of such discretion the same as if it had been exercised by
the state itself." The importance of Reitman to an understanding
of the effect of the Indiana statute is illuminated by an examination
of the similarities and distinctions between the California and
Indiana legislative acts.
Similarities
It is not difficult to locate significant similarities between the
California amendment considered in Reitman and the Indiana
statute governing university disciplinary policies. It is submitted
that each enactment created a state authorized right of individuals
to commit private acts violative of the constitutional rights of
others. The Indiana statute illustrates the legislature's belief that
private university officials are free, by constitutional authority,
to pursue any noncriminal disciplinary actions. 5 Although a case
for state action cannot be based upon the Indiana constitution, the
Indiana statute invoked precisely the same legislative authority to
act as did the California constitutional amendment. 6 Indiana, as
well as California, authorized private violations of the United
States Constitution. Each state government implemented such
33. The Court concluded, with reference to the analysis of Justice
Clark's majority opinion in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961), that California had placed its power, property, and prestige
behind the admitted discrimination. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,

380 (1966).
34. C. Black, State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 84 (1967). In this article, Professor Black
emphasizes that legislation satisfies the state action requirements if nothing
else does. In cases involving legislation, the inquiry shifts from the issue
of state action per se to the substance of the particular enactment in question.
35. IND. CODE § 35-19-4-6 (1969) states:
Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as affecting the right of any
person. . . . (emphasis added).
36. The ultimate consideration in determining state action is one of
effect rather than form. A constitutional amendment is the clearest method
of creating a right of citizens. Yet, the mere manifestation of a legislature's
belief that their citizens possess a peculiar right is all that the state action
problem requires.
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authorization by granting what they believed to be a right to commit such unconstitutional acts to private citizens and/or private
institutions.
The extremely general language contained in each of the enactments comprises the second important similarity. 7 An exceedingly broad authority is given to private individuals in each instance. Although it has been argued that specific state requirements are essential to a finding of state action within legislation,
Justice White rejected any such need in Reitman. 8 The right of
private individuals to exercise complete discretion creates innumerable possibilities of infringements upon constitutionally protected liberties. Express commands from the state to private
citizens which force constitutional violations are inherently limited
in their effects. Although, in such cases, some unconstitutional
acts are certain to follow, the state does not leave the scope of the
violations to the creativity of its populace. State permission for
complete discretion is far more dangerous. The potential violations which find protection in the Indiana statute are left only to
the inclinations of private university officials. The general terms
employed by the Indiana legislature fashion the type of threat
which the Court chose to eradicate in Reitman.
Distinctions
Distinctions can be drawn between the California amendment
and the Indiana statute. The most compelling difference between
the two goes to their very substance. The California amendment
opened the door for racial discrimination, whereas the Indiana
statute permits abuse of procedural due process. Those who adhere
to the historical reasoning of the Slaughter-House Cases may be
unwilling to expand the application of the fourteenth amendment
into the realm of nonracial questions.
A contemporary hesitancy to treat race-related cases and cases
not related to questions of race alike, for the purposes of invoking
37. Neither enactment limits the discretion granted to private individuals and/or institutions. Each enactment authorizes uninhibited discretion. See notes 24 and 29 supra.
38. See note 20 supra.
39. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The majority argued that
the fourteenth amendment could only be read within its historical context.
Having identified the intent of the amendment's framers as limiting the
amendment to the attainment of complete equality (by law) of the black
race, the justices claimed that they were forced to limit the effect of the
amendment to cases of racial discrimination.
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the standards of the fourteenth amendment, has been reflected in
case law as well as in scholarly law review articles."° Although the
issue is not settled, the Seventh Circuit recently manifested this
hesitancy. The majority opinion in Bright v. Isenbarger' stated:
The district court reasoned that the state action doctrine
was developed in response to efforts to eliminate private
racial discrimination. .

.

. It thought there might be a

less demanding standard of what constitutes sufficient
state involvement than where there are allegations of
racial discrimination. We find it unnecesary to decide
whether state action cases not involving attacks on racial
discrimination require a more demanding standard of what
constitutes state involvement. "2
A reluctance to use a lenient standard for defining requisite state
activity in cases unrelated to issues of racial discrimination was
pinpointed in Professor Charles Black's approach to Reitman."3
I limit this generalization [that generalization which can
be adduced from the Reitman decision] to the racial question on the assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment
marks racial groups-Negroes primarily but other racial
groups within the clear equity of the statute-as groups
against whose interest and immunity from discrimination
no state measures of any kind may be justified on a bal40. See generally Coleman v. Wagner, 429 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1970);
Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1394 (N.D. Ind.) rev'd, 445 F.2d
412, 413 (7th Cir. 1971); FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE

26 (1968); C. Black, State Action, Equal ProCalifornia's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Van
Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961).
F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
at 413. But see Coleman v. Wagner, 429 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir.

PUBLIC/PRIVATE PENUMBRA

tection,
Alstyne
41.
42.

and
and
445
Id.

1970):

It is arguable-indeed, I have argued-that racial discrimination is
so peculiarly offensive and was so much the prime target of the
fourteenth amendment that a lesser degree of involvement may constitute "state action" with respect to it than would be required in
other contexts. .

.

. Actually the historical meaning could be more

usefully viewed as creating protections for any identifiable class or
group against treatment as second class citizens or slaves. Certainly
students constitute such an identifiable group and arguably the denial
of due process rights for them relegates them to a status easily within
the contemplated reach of the Reconstruction Amendments.
43. C. Black, State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967).
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ance of convenience, or on local assessment of the worthiness of competing interests."
Black's reasoning lends sophistication to the Slaughter-House Cases
reservations in cases not related to race issues. Whereas the
analysis of the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases was permeated
by a fear of excessive federal power in our constitutional scheme,
Black's view approaches the substance of each state action inquiry.
Black's hesitancy to apply fourteenth amendment standards liberally is not founded upon the history of the amendment. Black's
position is predicated upon the assumption that states are more
likely to have over-riding interests to justify intrustions upon individual rights in cases not involving race discrimination than in
cases which do relate to discrimination issues. Justifications for
discrimination by race are unimaginable due to the significance of
the problem of racism itself. Courts are determined to place minority races within a specially protected class. 5
Crucially, Black and others have challenged the traditional notion that prior to utilization of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause, there must be a determination that there is: (1)
requisite state involvement; and (2) an absence of state interest
which overrides the harm of excessive state intrusion into the
constitutionally protected zone. Black's position is that the requisite state action fluctuates according to the state interest involved.
Since no state interest justifies racism, less state involvement will
mandate use of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
in race-related cases than in other contexts. The role of the court
becomes one of balancing the need for a state intrusion with the
44. Id. at 82.
45. Race has become a suspect classification. Such classifications, within
a statute, are justified only when a compelling state interest for the classification has been proven. Professor Black's rule for Reitman is as follows:

Where a racial group is in a political duel with those who would
explicitly discriminate against it as a racial group, and where

the regulatory action the racial group wants is of full and undoubted
federal constitutionality, the state may not place in the way of the
racial minority's attaining its political goal any barriers which, within
the state's political system taken as a whole, are especially difficult
of surmounting, by comparison with those barriers that normally
stand in the way of those who wish to use political processes to get
what they want.
Id. at 82. Black is saying two things: 1) the test for state action will be
different (less demanding) for private activity involving race; and 2) the
state must produce a greater interest, a more compelling interest to justify
any state action involving racial discrimination. See generally San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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significance of the deprivation of constitutional rights. Conseqently, policy considerations are given a quasidoctrinal status similar to the varying standards employed for use of the equal protection clause. " '
Those who would require more state action in the private
university context than in the race-related cases place themselves
in a dilemma. They are forced to defend a position which affords
Indiana's public university students fourteenth amendment guarantees, while students in Indiana's private universities must remain
outside of the fourteenth amendment protection. Successful rationalization of Indiana's involvement in private university discipline policy requires proof of a state interest which overrides the
significance of the denial of fourteenth amendment protection
to Indiana's private university students. If the state does not
benefit from the lack of due process afforded students in private
schools, that state can claim no such overriding state interest. The
state must demonstrate that public students receiving the protection
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause thereby lose
educational opportunities, whereas private students do not. It
could then be contended that the state has an interest in maintaining private students' rights to these opportunities.
Surely the state cannot claim an economic benefit from the
denial of rights in the private sector. All costs of institutionalizing
due process guarantees would be the burden of the private sectorhence, most likely, of the students themselves. If benefits to Indiana resulting from the lack of due process in private educational
institutions cannot be clearly demonstrated, the state interest
test cannot be met. Ultimately, the private university setting cannot
be substantially different from the race cases.
A second distinction between the California amendment and the
Indiana law is that the California predicament in Reitman required
46. If one assumes, arguendo, that the interest test can be met, the
fourteenth amendment standards may still be applicable. It could be contended that education is so fundamental that there must be compelling state
interest prior to expelling students without first affording them due process.
Although San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) did not determine that education is a fundamental right, an absolute
deprivation of education, after one has been assured of receiving it, may require
a different conclusion. People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706
(D. Ct. Nassau County, New York 1968) states:

The price of a modern education is not the waiver or surrender of
constitutional privileges. One does not salvage a democratic society
by adopting undemocratic techniques.
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use of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause," whereas the private university situation could only be rectified by use
of the due process clause. 8 The racial discrimination in California
necessitated litigation to ensure equal treatment for blacks, whereas the deprivation of rights of students mandates a suit to secure
procedural protection in the university disciplinary systems. There
is no basis for the view that relaxed standards exist for use of the
equal protection clause which do not exist for the due process
clause. Professor Black acknowledged this lack of significantly differing standards.
One should emphasize here that the equal protection clause,
even in wording, may furnish a basis for especially ample
latitude with respect to the finding of significant 'state
action' or 'inaction.' But for the purposes of an overview
the picture does not change very much if one considers
the 'state action' doctrine as a whole, in its application
to other constitutional guarantees. "9
The final significant distinction is one of form. Whereas
California wrote its enactment into the state's constitution, Indiana merely enacted a statute. It is the effect of the state's action
rather than the form of the state's action which is salient. The
requisite partnership between the state and private parties can be
determined by the private parties' perception of the state's act."
Many acts by representatives of states, of far less magnitude than
either a constitutional amendment or a statute, have been beld to
be state action. Mere proclamations of policy by town mayors suffice to create state action.5 A majority of the Supreme Court con2
that the mayoral pronouncement,
cluded in Lombard v. Louisiana"
"I have today directed the superintendent of police that no additional sit-in demonstrations . . . will be permitted . . ., " was
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section states in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
48. Id.
49. C. Black, State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 85 (1967).
50. See Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Friendly, J., concurring).
51. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 271.
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state action. The effects of California's amendment and Indiana's
statute are identical for the purpose of a state action inquiry.
Each state, through its legislative branch, manifested support for
private discretion. Neither state chose to limit its support to discretion exercised only within the confines of the United States
Constitution.
The effect of Reitman54 and the other race-related cases upon
the private university situation in Indiana is significant. Reitman
clarified the guidelines for proof of state action. The Indiana
legislation is analogous to the California enactment contemplated
in Reitman. It is crucial that the state action principle established
in Reitman is in its initial stage. Some courts are freely utilizing the
principle in contexts other than the area of racial discrimination.
State action in discipline procedures within private universities has
received judicial review.
THE THEORY AS APPLIED TO PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES

Traditionally, private educational institutions have enjoyed
complete isolation from the strictures of state government. However, just as the problems of rising costs for facilities and faculties
have forced the private schools to accept state and/or federal education aid, the need to maintain an atmosphere conducive to the
education of the student population has caused the states to intervene in the disciplinary functions of private educational institutions.
Certain state legislatures have legislated guidelines for private
university discipline. Although the legislative state action doctrine
has been utilized predominently within other contexts, recent decisions indicate that it may be appropriate to the private university.
New York enacted a statute requiring that private university
disciplinary procedure be written and registered with the state.5 6
54.
55.

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966).
It has been made apparent that legislation need not dictate that

private citizens act according to specified procedures in order that there be
state action when private individuals, acting pursuant to the legislation,
violate the freedom of others. Significantly, the precise action taken by the
private individuals need not be defined or described in the statute itself. See

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966).
56. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6450 (McKinney 1969). The statute reads:
The trustees or other governing board of every college chartered by
the regents or incorporated by special act of the legislature shall

adopt rules and regulations for the maintenance of public order on
college campuses and other college property used for educational purposes and provide a program for the enforcement thereof.

Such

rules and regulations shall govern the conduct of students, faculty
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Public and private university officials were required to publish
their own sets of rules. The substance of these rules was left to
the official's discretion. Acting upon the legislature's enactment,
Wagner College, a private New York school, registered. its published rules and regulations with the state. Twenty-four black students were later expelled by Wagner College without first receiving
fourteenth amendment procedural due process guarantees."7 The
students contended that they possessed the right to prior notice of
their specific violations of university regulations. Additionally,
the students claimed the right to a fair hearing prior to any expulsions. 8 The district court dismissed the students' complaint
for failing to state a cause of action. The Second Circuit determined that the district court had been "too hasty" in its dismissal of
the students' complaint."' The case was remanded to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing; at such time, plaintiffs could
introduce evidence to establish that the New York law constituted
a state intrusion into the disciplinary policies of private universi-

and other staff as well as visitors on such campuses and property.
The penalties for violations of such rules and regulations shall be
clearly set forth therein, and shall include provisions for the ejection
of a violator from such campus and property, and in case of a student
or faculty his suspension, expulsion or other appropriate disciplinary
action. Such rules and regulations shall be filed with the regents
and the commissioner of education not later than ninety days after
the effective date of this act. All amendments to such rules and regulations shall be filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than 10 days after their adoption. 2. If the trustees or
other governing board of a college fails to file the rules and regulations within the time required by this section such college shall not be
eligible to receive any state aid or assistance until such rules and
regulations are duly filed. 3. Nothing contained in this section is intended nor shall it be construed to limit or restrict the freedom of
speech or peaceful assembly.
57. Although the black students contended that they were discriminated against due to their race, the issue of procedural due process is divorced from consideration of the race discrimination issue.
58. All of the students were expelled without being notified of their
specific violation of university regulations. The expulsions were made effective prior to any hearing. See Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d
1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
59. In Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970), the
majority viewed the lower court's unwillingness to search for the legislature's intent beyond the face of the statute as an inadequate approach to
the state action question.
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ties."0 The court's effort to determine the applicability of the
statutory state action theory to this private college circumstance
focused upon the criteria established in the race-related decisions.'
In considering the applicability of state action, the majority
in Coleman v. Wagner College" expressed a desire to discover the
intention of the legislators when they passed the legislation in
question.
The statute may have been intended, or may be
applied, to mean more than it purports to say. More
specifically, section 6450 may be intended or applied as a
command to the colleges of the state to adopt a new, more
severe attitude toward campus disruption and to impose
harsh actions on unruly students. 3
The court determined that the intent of the statute is important to
the ultimate determination of state action. If the state of New
York intended that private university officials pursue standards
of conduct which would suppress "unruly students," the university
policies would be cloaked with state action."
IND. CODE § 35-19-4-6 clearly meets the test established in
Coleman. It was intended to suppress the activities of "unruly
students."'" The legislature of Indiana wished to ensure that trespasses upon public university property would be severely punished. It is crucial that the statute conferred a greater variety and
scope of powers upon the officials of universities than merely those
associated with trespass; the law allows all private disciplinary
60. Id. at 1125.
61. Justice Kaufman, writing for the majority, underscored that a
significant state intrusion must be established. The language of his majority opinion inferred that the court sought the type of partnership necessitated by Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1971). Justice Friendly, in his concurring opinion, seemed to
implement the standards of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961), and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966). His inquiry
emphasized the burden upon plaintiffs to locate "authorization," "encouragement," or even a "symbolic" state presence. See Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1970).
62. 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
63. Id. at 1124.
64. See note 55 supra.

65. Interview with Representative Bray, member of the Indiana House
of Representatives, in Indianapolis, January 23, 1975. After reviewing records of the committee hearings and of the floor debate, Assemblyman Bray
stated, in regard to IND. CODE § 35-19-4-6 that "the legislature was obviously
responding to riots on college campuses."
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action chosen by private university officials. The Indiana statute
was promulgated with intentions which meet the-test of Coleman.
An effective examination of the Indiana statute must recall
that Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion in Coleman, postulated that a state statute drafted with an intent to suppress disruptions within private university communities effectively transforms
all discipline procedures from private into state acts.6" This transformation occurs whether or not the private acts were initiated
prior to the legislation.' The transformation is complete where the
specific action is left to the discretion of private university
officials. 8
It can thus be forcefully argued, a private college in promulgating rules and regulations for the maintenance of
order on campus is exercising a power emanating from the
legislature even though it could have acted on its own,
as many in fact had done."9
Judge Friendly's analysis logically would place all disciplinary
action taken by private universities in Indiana within the purview
of the general language of IND. CODE § 35-19-4-6. By authorizing or
encouraging private university officials to utilize complete discretion in formulating university conduct policies, the state became a
partner in such policies.
* Although the Coleman decision provides the private university
case law which is most analogous to the Reitman decision, the
state of Indiana itself has case law involving state action and
private educational institutions. In one case, Bright v. Isenbarger,°
a private high school in Fort Wayne had expelled two students
for wandering across the street to the grounds of a public high
school. The pupils' nefarious conduct occurred during the private
institution's regular schoolday hours. The Seventh Circuit determined that the disciplinary action of the school was not state
action. Although the school was chartered with the state, it was
not prohibited from functioning without such a charter. It is
66.

Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly,

J., concurring).
67. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1947).
68. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966), the Court found California's amendment which allowed discretion in renting to be state action
when a property owner refused to rent to a black man.
69. Coleman v. Wagner, 429 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly,
J., concurring).

70.

445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
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crucial, however, that the court manifested extreme interest in the
Coleman decision. The implication of the court's opinion is that a
statute would have constituted sufficient state involvement. The majority in Bright carefully noted that the fact situation which they
confronted was unlike that which was confronted by the Second
Circuit in Coleman. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the plaintiffs never alleged statutory state action. The court's reference to
the Coleman"' decision notwithstanding the failure of plaintiff's
counsel to bring the Coleman case to the court's attention, underscores a manifest willingness on the part of the Seventh Circuit
to scrutinize the Coleman doctrine. Citing the Coleman decision,
the court in Bright stated:
The college had adopted public order rules and regulations.
The case was remanded to determine if the statute represents a meaningful intrusion into the disciplinary policies
of private colleges and universities. No such intrusion
has been alleged here.7 2
The court maintained that there was an absence of Indiana
statutory interference with secondary school discipline: "No Indiana statute authorized Central Catholic High School to expel
these plaintiffs. . . ."" Bright infers that the existence of such
a statute would have placed state action behind the dismissal of
the plaintiffs. The court failed to consider the effect of IND. CODE
§ 35-19-4-6. Not only did the plaintiffs fail to draw the court's
attention to this or any other statute, ' but IND. CODE § 35-19-4-6
was not located within any of the code provisions which related
to the topical area of education, since it is a criminal statute."'
Court adoption of the Coleman state action theory would have
far reaching effects upon the disciplinary procedures within private universities in the state of Indiana. A brief analysis of the disciplinary codes now being used at four of Indiana's private universities demonstrates that the impact could be considerable."'
71.

Id. at 414.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 415.
74. Interview with Ivan Bodensteiner, plaintiff's counsel, September
1974. Mr. Bodensteiner stated that he did not utilize IND. CODE § 35-19-4
(1969).
75. It is highly unlikely that the court even sought applicable statutes.
Since legislative state action was not an issue, the court had no reason to
locate such a statute. Any search under the heading of education would
have been futile.
76. The random selection of Butler University, DePauw University,

University of Notre Dame, and Valparaiso University should not be construed
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Disciplinary codes which fall within the purview of the fourteenth amendment must have clarity. Specific standards of clarity
are required by the incorporation of the first amendment into
the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court ruled that unless
regulations may be understood by men of reasonable intelligence,
they are void. The Court declared in Baggett v. Bullitt.'
The statute therefore fell within the compass of those
decisions of the court holding that a law forbidding or
requiring conduct in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates due process of law. "
It is submitted that Butler University Handbook regulations
are unconstitutionally vague. The student handbook provides:
In addition to compliance with the rules herein, students
are expected to maintain high standards of conduct ....
Students who are in violation of either the specific rules
or high standards should expect disciplinary penalties,
including expulsion, if deemed appropriate by Butler
University.7"
The clause "high standards of conduct" as well as the clause
"disciplinary penalties, . . . deemed appropriate by Butler Uni-

versity," fails the objective test of Baggett.8 ° Reasonable men
would differ upon their subjective understandings of these clauses.
Critically, the ambiguity permeates both the substance of the
offenses and the corresponding penalties.8 ' One of Butler's specific
rules challenges the latitude of Baggett:
as evidence that the disciplinary procedures of the remaining private universities within Indiana meet the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
77. 377 U.S. 360 (1963).
78. Id. at 367. The Washington statute required that no subversive
person could be eligible for state employment. The term "subversive person"
was found to be unconstitutionally vague. Significantly the statute did not
include criminal penalties. The absence of criminal penalties within private
university regulations is, therefore, not salient.
79. Student Handbook Butler University 16 (1973).
80. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1963), requires that such rules
be understandable to men of average intelligence. Butler's rules would receive
a myriad of interpretations. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
81. It is unclear as to whether or not Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1963), requires that both the substance of the offense as well as the corresponding penalty be vague. A holding that both must be vague is, however, seemingly highly unlikely.
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An individual or a group involved in mob activity which
results in injury, destruction of property, or the obstructing of the normal functioning of the university will be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action.2
"Mob activity" is descriptive of something which possesses emotional overtones. The requisite number of persons, as well as the
essential iniquitous activities, is left to educated guessing. The
rules and regulations of DePauw, 3 Notre Dame.8 " and Valparaiso"
adhere to the Butler pattern of vagueness. Students are not notified
of what specific conduct is prohibited by these universities. Students are, instead, informed that their school will punish and/or
expel students when, in the school's judgment, a student or
group of students must be so punished. The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to avoid circumstances in which persons are not
placed in prior notice of what specific actions are not permitted.
Clearly, many of the regulations of these four universities provide

no such notice.
It has been established that due process of law prohibits
state educational institutions from expelling students without first
notifying them of their specific charges; the students must also
be afforded an opportunity for a fair hearing." The Supreme Court
has provided guidelines for these required proceedings. One must
82. Student Handbook Butler University 16 (1973).
83. Rules and Regulations DePauw University 1, 18 (1974). The
DePauw Pamphlet reads:
Social regulations are not static. They are, rather, in a state of continuing evolution.*** There is general agreement that any organized
community requires standards of safety, orderliness, and means by
which the total community can best implement its goals.*** The board
delegates broad responsibilities to the President. The university
cannot tolerate disruptive behavior on the part of any student and
maintain what it holds to be acceptable standards of conduct in guiding students toward becoming well educated, considerate, moral, and
dedicated citizens.
84. Du Lac Notre Dame 26 (1974). This discipline handbook states:
The University traditionally reserves the right to deny the privilege
of enrollment to any student whose conduct or attitude is believed to
be detrimental to the welfare of the University.
85. Valparaiso University 20 (1974). This university handbook provides:
The University reserves the right to terminate a student's enrollment
whenever, in its opinion, his conduct is prejudicial to the best interests of the University.
86. Dixon v. Alabama Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), requiring notice and a rudimentary hearing for 10-day suspension from public school.
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be allowed the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the
right to counsel, and the right to an impartial decision maker. The
ultimate determination of guilt or innocence "must rely solely
upon the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing."8 It
cannot be postulated with certainty that the Supreme Court would
require that the safeguards in the university setting be identical
to those prescribed in cases of welfare termination. The greater
the threatened loss is to an individual, the greater his procedural
due process safeguards will be. It could be persuasively contended
that the loss of welfare benefits is a greater loss than the loss
of an educational opportunity. Nevertheless, Goldberg v. Kelly"
enlightens one as to the genre of appropriate standards of fairness.
The Goldberg standards of procedural due process guarantees
require protective standards which cannot be found within many
of Indiana's private universities. Interestingly, while each school
grants hearings, none of the hearings are ultimately determinative
of a student's guilt or innocence, or of the concomitant sanctions.
Final determination of a student's liability for sanctions is left to
the discretion of uiniversity officials. Those officials who possess
this ultimate power need not attend the hearings, or even base
their conclusions upon the hearings. Additionally, the prescribed
regimentation of the hearings themselves is unconstitutional in
the case of each school.8
CONCLUSION

Although the state of Indiana has adopted the burden of
freeing private educational institutions from the unwanted influence of disruptive students, it has failed to accept the responsibilities of its new role.
If the state wishes the benefits of such deterrence in
private colleges, must it not accept responsibility for
87. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court overruled a
New York procedure which allowed summary terminations of welfare benefits in the absence of a hearing. The hearing standards established by the
court are designed to define the rigors of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
88. Id.
89. Du Lac Notre Dame 28, 29 (1974); Student Handbook Butler University 19 (1973); Rules and Regulations DePauw University (1974); Valparaiso University (1974). Notre Dame permits the Dean of Students to
summarily suspend or expel students. A hearing is eventually convened to
review the Dean's decision. However, any directive from the office of the
Dean of Students has the force of a university regulation. If the Dean, for
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preventing over deterrence by excessive sanctions and lack
of fair procedure for enforcement?"0
The legislature of Indiana sought to promote tranquility
upon all college and university campuses within the state. The
method which the legislature chose was the promulgation of
IND. CODE § 35-19-4-6. In their attempt to respond to student misconduct, the legislators have granted private university officials
a right to exercise unbounded discretion. The duty to protect
citizens from threatening conduct upon college campuses includes
the responsibility to protect the rights of those accused of threatening the safety of their fellow citizens. The legislature has authorized private university officials to do as they choose in disciplining
students. The state has not proceeded to ensure that the university
officials do not violate the constitutional guarantees of their students. Constitutional safegaurds must accompany the exercise of
the state-authorized power to discipline. The failure of Indiana
to ensure that such rights are protected has allowed systems of
discipline devoid of constitutional guarantees to flourish. Courts
of law should reconcile the conspicuous absence of due process
upon Indiana's private university campuses.
some reason, dislikes the decision of the hearing board, he may appeal to the
President. The President's finding does not have to be based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing. Butler University and Valparaiso University
utilize student quasi-judicial bodies for the hearing. However, if the President of either institution chooses to alter the board's decision, he may do so,
regardless of the evidence introduced at the hearing. DePauw University
rests all disciplinary authority in the Dean of Men and the Dean of Women;
only the deans "hear" a student's defense.
90. Coleman v. Wagner, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.
concurring).
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